The Ontario Experience with Interest Arbitration: Problems in Detecting Policy by Adams, George  W.
Érudit est un consortium interuniversitaire sans but lucratif composé de l'Université de Montréal, l'Université Laval et l'Université du Québec à
Montréal. Il a pour mission la promotion et la valorisation de la recherche. Érudit offre des services d'édition numérique de documents
scientifiques depuis 1998.
Pour communiquer avec les responsables d'Érudit : info@erudit.org 
Article
 
"The Ontario Experience with Interest Arbitration: Problems in Detecting Policy"
 
George W. Adams
Relations industrielles / Industrial Relations, vol. 36, n° 1, 1981, p. 225-250.
 
 
 
Pour citer cet article, utiliser l'information suivante :
 
URI: http://id.erudit.org/iderudit/029135ar
DOI: 10.7202/029135ar
Note : les règles d'écriture des références bibliographiques peuvent varier selon les différents domaines du savoir.
Ce document est protégé par la loi sur le droit d'auteur. L'utilisation des services d'Érudit (y compris la reproduction) est assujettie à sa politique
d'utilisation que vous pouvez consulter à l'URI https://apropos.erudit.org/fr/usagers/politique-dutilisation/
Document téléchargé le 11 février 2017 05:01
THE ONTARIO EXPÉRIENCE WITH INTEREST ARBITRATION... 225 
The Ontario Expérience 
with Interest Arbitration 
Problems in Detecting Policy 
George W. ADAMS 
This paper examines the expérience of the Province of 
Ontario with interest arbitration andfocuses moreparticularly on 
spécifie sec tors of activity representing critical areas. 
The most common substitute for resort to strike or lockout in interest 
disputes is interest arbitration. This procédure may take various forms: it 
may be automatic upon the failure of the preliminary conciliation; it may be 
mandatory upon submission of either party, regardless of the consent of the 
other parties; it may be confined to first agreement bargaining situations 
but only when bargaining breaks down; it may be imposed by the Govern-
ment on its own motion and within its sole discrétion, on an ad hoc basis; or 
it may be on the agreement of the parties. The only constant feature of thèse 
procédures is that a third party is ultimately responsible for determining the 
rules to govern the employee-employer relationship. As a dispute resolution 
technique, its importance in labour-management relations has tended to 
parallel the increasing percentage of national output distributed through 
non-market mechanisms, i.e. "the public sector". The gênerai explanations 
for its use usually focus on at least three justifications; sovereignty, monop-
oly, and public harm1. Ail three of thèse thèmes underlie any attempt to ra-
tionalize Ontario's use of interest arbitration. 
In simple terms, "sovereignty" stands for the notion that governments 
cannot accède to industrial action because to do so would compromise the 
sovereign authority to govern conferred on the législative body by the will 
of the people expressed by the ballot box. While it might be assumed that 
this notion has become an anachronism in an âge when governments hâve 
become the largest single employer in the economy and where the labour 
markets in which governments operate are structured so that no compétitive 
norm exists, it cannot be dismissed so easily in Ontario. Indeed, two gênerai 
inquiries of Ontario's public sector labour relations législation conducted at 
the end of the sixties placed considérable weight on this premise. In the 
Report of the Royal Commission Inquiry into Labour Disputes (1968) Mr. 
Justice Rand observed: 
* ADAMS, G.W., Chairman, Ontario Labour Relations Board. 
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The phenomenon in public service that is becoming clearer each day is the commitment of 
vital public functions to a rapidly increasing number of small minorities and the equally rapid 
expansion of community dependence on their faithful performance. When individuals or 
groups voluntarily undertake thèse responsibilities they enter a field of virtual monopoly; the 
community cannot secure itself against rejection of thèse responsibilities by maintaining a 
standby force which itself would be open to a similar freedom of action. Our society is built 
within a structure of interwoven trust, crédit and obligation; good faith and reliability are 
essential to its mode of living; and when thèse obligations are repudiated confusion may be the 
harbinger of social disintegration2. 
Echoing thèse thoughts Judge Walter Little also questioned the wisdom 
of granting the strike right to Ontario's civil servants when he wrote: 
Furthermore, our démocratie processes provide the methods by which the interests of the 
community are to be safeguarded. We choose by free élections those who would be entrusted 
with that responsibility and we hâve the opportunity at regular intervais of either affirming 
that trust or transferring it to others. Implicit in the sélection of those who will govern us is the 
duty of those selected to provide, without interruption, those services to which ail citizens are 
entitled by law to avail themselves. Therefore, despite my opposition to the imposition of com-
pulsory arbitration to settle industrial disputes in the private sector, I cannot accept the pro-
position that anyone who joins the public service, should hâve the right, in conjunction with 
others, to withdraw his services with the sole objective of compelling a duly elected government 
to meet their demands, no matter how meritorious they may be. To admit such proposition, is 
to imply that our processes of government, and the services which are provided by law for the 
benefit of ail citizens when required, can legally be rendered ineffectuai if a critical segment of 
public servants or crown employées should engage in strike action. The resuit of such enforced 
répudiation of its obligations to the community by the government could be, as stated by the 
late Honourable Mr. Rand, "the harbinger of social disintegration»3. 
Taken to extrême, therefore, the sovereignty viewpoint suggests that 
every strike by government employées, regardless of the reason, is a politi-
cal strike. However, in many situations the reality hardly corresponds with 
this perception. Even assuming that a strike against the government im-
plicitly rejects extrême claims of sovereignty, it does not necessarily foliow 
that strikes by government employées are challenges to the political System. 
In the majority of instances, they are simply attempts to obtain the same 
kinds of improved wages, hours, and working conditions as those for which 
employées strike in the private sector; and, frequently, public service strikes 
should logically be a cause for much less concern that those in the private 
sector. 
The "monopoly" argument is based on the related notion that most 
government services are offered on a monopolistic basis causing public sec-
tor trade unions to enjoy tremendous (and unfair) bargaining power when 
they threaten to strike. This view is more a tactical expression of the sover-
eignty argument put forward by Mr. Justice Rand. If it has merit, however, 
we should see public employée unions negotiating very favourable contracts 
and, yet, there is a substantial body of évidence that does not bear this out4. 
2 Report of the Royal Commission Inquiry into Labour Disputes, 1968, p. 111. 
3 Collective Bargaining in the Ontario Government Service, 1969, p. 42. 
4 See FEUILLE, Selected Benefits and Costs of Compulsory Arbitration, 1979, 33 In-
dus, and Lab. Rel. Rev., pp. 64-76 at page 66. 
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Nevertheless, where the government is the employer it should not be surpris-
ing that is has had difficulty minimizing this concern when acting in its rôle 
as labour relations policy maker. Indeed, when the expectations of a tax 
paying public to uninterrupted public services are combined with the spectre 
of a bargaining imbalance, one can see that policy making in public sector 
labour relations must be both courageous and altruistic. 
Even assuming that the arguments of sovereignty and monopoly can be 
overcome, a concern that some or ail public employée strikes actually harm 
the innocent public or will after a certain duration remains as a final stum-
bling block to the mass importation of private sector principles to public 
sector labour relations. One need only list the thousands of employées pro-
viding policing, fire fighting and médical services to the public to throw up 
the spectre of possible catastrophe arising out of "selfish" différences over 
money. The "public policy" response takes mère seconds for formulation 
despite the fact that assertions of catastrophe are usually undocumented. In 
short, the emotional nature of the issue can mean that policy may be more 
rooted in editorial opinion and the rhetoric of political anxiety than in any 
thought-out attempt to harmonize the conflicting public interests of collec-
tive bargaining and public safety. Ail too often one suspects that the public 
interest in this aspect of labour relations is simply equated with the need for 
a guarantee against work stoppages. Compulsory interest arbitration, albeit 
imperfectly, represents this guarantee. 
But I think it would be incorrect only to view interest arbitration as a 
process imposed on unwilling employées by narrow-minded governments 
on behalf of self-interested tax payers. As more and more expérience is 
gained with compulsory interest arbitration, it is becoming apparent that 
the institution is more than just an imperfect substitute for free collective 
bargaining. For example, the Government of Ontario is currently being lob-
bied by organized labour for the enactment of compulsory arbitration in 
first agreement bargaining situations. Ontario*s public health nurses are 
lobbying to be brought under The Hospital Labour Disputes Arbitration 
Act5 and extended the right of compulsory arbitration. Indeed thèse two in-
stances raise the gênerai policy issue of whether ail employées under private 
sector législation should be able to choose between strike action or interest 
arbitration in resolving their différences with employers — and, of course, 
vice versa. Professional engineers, having formed unions under the provi-
sions of The Ontario Labour Relations Act6, are conducting seminars about 
the benefits of interest arbitration as a technique to résolve collective bar-
gaining impasses. Access to interest arbitration in the private sector has 
been specifically provided for by amendments to The Labour Relations Act 
on the agreement of parties to a collective bargaining dispute. A number of 
teacher-schoolboard collective bargaining disputes hâve been striking 
teachers lobbying the Government or negotiating with the employer to end 
their strike by interest arbitration. One sees no massive campaign by 
Ontario's public servants, hospital employées, policemen or firemen against 
the compulsory arbitration that détermines their wages and other conditions 
of employment on an ongoing basis. In short, the process is nowhere near as 
unacceptable to employées as theory would suggest to be the case. 
5 R.S.O. 1970, c. 208. 
6 R.S.O. 1970, c. 232. 
228 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 36. NO 1 (1981) 
INSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST INTEREST ARBITRATION 
Any attempt to explain the patchwork application of interest arbitra-
tion in the Province of Ontario requires a brief review of the labour rela-
tions debate over the appropriateness of interest arbitration as an effective 
dispute resolution technique. Any inconclusiveness in the case against in-
terest arbitration leaves room for the opération of the more philosophie or 
emotional perceptions of the strike right discussed above. This reality can-
not be ignored. Moreover, as I review the particular expérience of Ontario 
with compulsory arbitration I want to refer back to the gênerai contours of 
this debate suggesting which expérience supports which argument. 
Those who view compulsory interest arbitration as a very weak alter-
native to free collective bargaining marshal their arguments around the rôle 
of conflict in a labour relations system. One of the best statements of this 
rôle is found in the report of the Task Force on Labour Relations (1968) at 
para. 392 and following7: 
There is a basic characteristic of the collective bargaining system that is seemingly con-
tradictory. Paradoxical as it may appear, collective bargaining is designed to résolve conflict 
through conflict, or at least through the threat of conflict. It is an adversary system in which 
two basic issues must be resolved: How available revenue is to be divided, and how the clash 
between managements drive for productive efficiency and the workers quest for job, income 
and psychic security are to be reconciled. Other major différences, including personality con-
flicts, may appear from time to time but normally they prove subsidiary to thèse two overriding 
issues. 
The Task Force went on to describe the rôle of économie conflict in func-
tional terms arguing that the strike or lockout serves as a catalyst to agree-
ment and as a catharsis for inévitable interpersonal workplace conflict. 
Focussing on the weaknesses of compulsory arbitration as a substitute 
for économie conflict the Task Force observed: 
One of the worst features of compulsory arbitration is its potentially corrosive effect on 
the decision-making process both within and between unions and management. It is natural 
that where both sides expect arbitration at the end of the line, should they fail to agrée, there 
will be a tendency to hold back a little for fear of establishing a new floor or ceiling for the ar-
bitration. There will be an equal reluctance on both sides to concède anything lest it be some-
thing the arbitrator might force them to give in his award. Compulsory arbitration need not 
hâve thèse inhibiting effects on collective bargaining, but there is a real risk that it will, 
especially the longer and more often it is imposed. 
Compulsory arbitration may also serve as a crutch for weak leadership in either union or 
management. When a union leader can force a dispute to arbitration he can avoid some of the 
compromises within the union and invariably go into a settlement. Instead of making the hard 
décisions about wage gains as against fringe benefits, across the board absolute as against 
percentage increases, skilled trade differentials, and other issues that can prove politically em-
barrassing, he can take ail internai conflicts to the arbitrator as demands and let him make the 
unpopular décisions. Similar évasion of responsibility can take place in management. Once a 
leader of any king finds an easy way out of some of his dilemmas, he is likely to behave in the 
same manner in other areas. In the long run the effect would be to undermine both the leader-
ship in question and the collective bargaining process itself8. 
7 Task Force on Labour Relations, Ottawa, Privy Council, 1968. 
8 Ibid., paragraphs 396, 397, 398. 
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Of course, the opponents of interest arbitration do not end their attack 
at the potential corrosive and narcotic effects of the process. They go on to 
point out the inability of arbitrators to develop meaningful principles by 
which to adjudicate interest disputes. They argue that such disputes are in-
herently "polycentric" in nature with the resuit that arbitrators are unable 
to satisfy the parties that their interests hâve really been taken into account9. 
The "parasitic" criteria that tend to be relied upon are said to be inherently 
unstable and that, in any event, there are real limitations on the ability of an 
arbitration board to provide meaningful answers to complex labour rela-
tions problems. To this is added the risk that arbitration awards may hâve 
an adverse économie effect on the economy and the fact that the process 
does not effectively eliminate work stoppages. Indeed, it may, they suggest, 
exacerbate mid-term industrial relations conflict. 
Increasingly, however, others are arguing that the case against com-
pulsory interest arbitration is more rhetoric than substance10. Thèse ob-
servers suggest that the data on both the corrosive and narcotic effect of 
compulsory arbitration is at best arguable or tentative. They point out that 
the économie impact of compulsory arbitration appears to hâve been mar-
ginal11. They also stress that award usage is in the 15 to 25 per cent area and 
does not seem to be increasing over time. (Although others hâve discovered 
a rising incidence of arbitration over 4 rounds of bargaining under the 
Public Service Staff Relations Act.)12 Indeed, some proponents of interest 
arbitration point out that an effective System of compulsory arbitration has 
never been implemented in the sensé of establishing proper criteria and 
research capacity in an impartial agency responsible for the development of 
very detailed labour market and wage information. It is further argued that 
many of the imperfections of compulsory arbitration can be eliminated or 
at least modified by adopting particular forms of compulsory arbitration. 
For example, final offer sélection and "med-arb" are recommended as 
techniques designed to avoid or soften the so-called corrosive and narcotic 
impacts of compulsory arbitration13. 
9 See D. J.M. BROWN, Interest Arbitration, Task Force Labour Relations, Study No. 
18, Ottawa, Privy Council, 1968. 
10 See generally B. DOWNIE, The Behavioural Economie and Institutional Effects of 
Compulsory Interest Arbitration, Economie Council of Canada, 1979, Discussion Paper No. 
147. J. Joseph LOWENBERG éd., Compulsory Arbitration, An International Comparison, 
1976. 
11 See COUSINEAU and LACROIX, Wage Détermination in Major Collective Agree-
ments, Economie Council of Canada 1977. But see AULD, Christofides, SWIDINSKY, 
Wilton, The Déterminants of Negotiated Wage Settlements In Canada (1966-75): A Micro-
econometric Analysis, 1979. This study of 191 public sector wage settlements concluded that 
arbitral wage settlements bear no resemblance to freely negotiated settlements. The authors 
also stress that award usage is in the 15 to 25 per cent area and does not appear to be increasing 
over time. 
12 ANDERSON and KOCHAN, "Impasse Procédures in the Canadian Fédéral Service: 
Effects on the Bargaining Process", 1976-77, 30 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 283. 
13 See STEVENS, "Is Compulsory Arbitration Compatible with Bargaining", 1966, 5 
Indus. Rel. 38. KAGEL, "Combining Médiation and Arbitration", 1973, 96, Monthly Lab. 
Rev. 62. 
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Drawing back from the eut and thrust of this debate for a moment, it is 
apparent that both sides assume one monolithic industrial relations System. 
Compulsory interest arbitration is either right or wrong. This assumption 
ignores the fact that Canada is a politically diverse country reflecting ré-
gional économie and social characteristics. And within each political juris-
diction labour-management relations consist of a multitude of industrial 
relations Systems14. Fortunately, the constitutional allocation of respon-
sibility for labour relations allows our country to accommodate the diverse 
political and régional interests in its labour relations laws, but within each jurisdiction there tends to be a drive towards the uniform application of 
laws, be they labour relations oriented or otherwise. This uniform ap-
proach, like our debate, ignores the fact that différent labour-management 
relationships react differently to compulsory arbitration schemes. Police-
men and firemen are organized along paramilitary lines, and policemen, in 
particular, do not see their associations as part of the gênerai labour move-
ment15. The acceptance of compulsory arbitration by thèse groups of em-
ployées belies many of the arguments just discussed. In fact, the very exis-
tence of compulsory interest arbitration in public sector labour relations 
laws may hâve attracted many white collar and professional employées to 
collective bargaining who would otherwise hâve been repelled from a "right 
to strike" brand of trade unionism. The growth in thèse latter occupations 
has been concentrated in the public sector and their appetite for interest ar-
bitration is well documented and understood16. Adding more grey to the 
debate is the view that "free collective bargaining" in a modem economy is 
more contrived than real and that the proper management of our economy 
requires less individual freedom, not more. John Kenneth Galbraith, mak-
ing the case for permanent wage and price control, has pointed oui: that the 
modem large corporation has extensive influence over its priées and over its 
costs. It supplies much of its capital from its own earnings. It strongly in-
fluences the tastes and behaviour of its consumers. He has therefore sug-
gested that in this concentrated sector of the economy trade unions and em-
ployers are walking hand in glove and their joint détermination of wages 
and priées may be no more acceptable to employées and very much less con-
sistent with the public interest than if the outeome was imposed by third 
party détermination17. 
The more one looks at industrial relations in today's economy, the less 
one can distinguish where spécial public interest ends and normal private in-
terest begins. In fact, there is a continuum of labour-management relations, 
some imbued with extrême public interest and, at the other end of the spec-
trum, those with little public significance. It has been observed that "where 
one begins and the other ends is a political question which, in part, will be 
determined by individual case and tirne18." As a gênerai matter, however, 
14 See generally DUNLOP, Industrial Relations Systems, 1958. 
15 See H.W. ARTHURS, Collective Bargaining by Public Employées in Canada: Five 
Models, 1971 at 78. 
16 See G. ADAMS, "Collective Bargaining by Salaried Professionals", in Slayton and 
Treblicock eds., The Professions and Public Policy, 1976 at 264. 
17 See generally J. GALBRAITH, Economies and The Public Purpose, 1976 and Annals 
of an Abiding Libéral, 1979. 
18 See generally PHILLIPS, "Collective Bargaining Dynamics and the Public Interest 
Sectors: The Market and Politics", in Gunderson éd., Collective Bargaining in the Essential 
and Public Service Sectors, p. 38. 
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there are at least seven principal areas which are usually considered to hâve 
inordinate public interest in that the disruption of service may threaten one 
or more of safety or health; necessary government; or the basic links of the 
economy. Thèse critical areas might be ranked in the foliowing order: police 
and firemen; hospitals and médical care; utilities; transportation; municipal 
services; civil servants; teachers and educational authorities. 
What is interesting about Ontario is the uneven application of com-
pulsory interest arbitration to thèse seven catégories of employées. Of the 
seven catégories, only three (police and firemen, hospitals, and civil ser-
vants) are covered by compulsory arbitration schemes. The other catégories 
enjoy free collective bargaining and in some cases hâve their own collective 
bargaining statute tailored to particular needs and bargaining history. On 
occasion, however, they too expérience the imposition of compulsory ar-
bitration by way of ad hoc législation. Ontario therefore ranks neither as 
the most innovative nor as the least innovative in its utilization of interest 
arbitration. And like other jurisdictions, the uneven application of the pro-
cess is as much a reflection of différent interest group pressures as it is a dis-
criminating concern for the public's welfare and the theoretical dictâtes of 
labour-management relations. 
ONTARIO'S USE OF INTEREST ARBITRATION 
As of December 1979, 13.5% of employées working under provincial 
collective agreements were covered by agreements reached under laws re-
quiring compulsory arbitration. The breakdown was as follows: under The 
Hospital Labour Disputes Arbitration Act, 66,700 employées covered in 
558 agreements; under The Crown Employées Collective Bargaining Act, 
56,100 employées in 10 agreements; under The Police Act, 14,600 em-
ployées in 141 agreements; under The Fire Departments Act, 7,700 em-
ployées in 78 agreements. 
In 1978, 2,848 collective agreements were negotiated affecting 581,438 
employées. Only 87 or 3% of thèse agreements were the resuit of com-
pulsory arbitration, covering 16,201 or 2.8% of the total employées af-
fected. In 1979, 5% of the total 3,309 agreements negotiated were the pro-
duct of compulsory arbitration, affecting 8.4% of the total 600,044 em-
ployées involved. I also think it important to keep in mind the gênerai in-
cidence of strike activity in Ontario against which should be compared the 
incidence of arbitration in any particular relationship. In 1975 (the A.I.B. 
year) 6.1 % of ail agreements were settled after a strike and thèse settlements 
applied to 15.2% of employées subject to settlements that year. In 1978 the 
figures were 3.7% and 5.5% respectively and in 1979 3.2% and 8.3%19. 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING BY POLICE AND FIREFIGHTERS 
The collective bargaining system for police in Ontario is highly struc-
tured, but distinctly différent from the private sector system. Police work is 
19 Data compiled by the Research Branch, Ontario Ministry of Labour. 
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concerned with a protection of persons, property and public order and 
therefore police employment disputes are settled by arbitration without 
stoppage of work. Members of police forces were specifically excluded from 
The Collective Bargaining Act, 194320. In 1947, however, they were given 
the right to bargain with municipalities21. Excluding the Fédéral Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police, there are two types of police forces in Ontario; 
the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) and the municipal police forces. The 
municipal police forces hâve jurisdiction within organized municipalities, 
while the OPP serves sparsely populated areas which do not hâve their own 
forces. Both the OPP and the municipal forces are regulated by The Police 
Act22 and the régulations under it. Collective bargaining and arbitration 
procédures for municipal police are also established by this statute23, while 
The Public Service Act24 which governs the Provincial Government's em-
ployées also applies to the OPP. 
While it is true that police hâve enjoyed the right of free collective bar-
gaining and compulsory arbitration since 194725, Professor Harry Arthurs 
has observed that it was not until the émergence of strong police associa-
tions in Toronto and at the provincial level that thèse rights gathered real 
significance26. In the early 1960's both groups acquired full-time présidents 
and expanded staffs. This development went hand in hand with an increas-
ed awareness of the advantages of collective action among non-blue collar 
workers generally in Canada and over the last fifteen years collective bar-
gaining between police associations and their employers has been pock-
marked by confrontation and exhibits a heavy reliance on arbitration. 
One of the most celebrated cases of récent vintage involved a request by 
the Metropolitan Toronto Police Association that ail uniformed patrol cars 
be manned by two fully trained and armed police officers while on patrol. 
While in previous awards arbitrators had adopted the view that this mann-
ing décision was a matter of judgment on the part of both commissioners 
and the heads of forces which should not be interfered with by an arbitra-
20 S.O. 1943, c. 4. 
21 The Police Amendment Act, 1947, S.O. 1947, c. 77, s. 10. 
22 R.S.O. 1970, c. 351. 
23 The Police Amendment Act, 1972, S.O. 1972, c. 103 established the Ontario Police 
Arbitration Commission to oversee the process and provided for a conciliation mechanism and 
sole arbitrators. 
24 R.S.O. 1970, c. 386. When The Crown Employées Collective Bargaining Act S.O. 
1972, c. 67 was enacted, the O . P . P . were excluded from its provisions but an amendment to the 
Public Service Act recognized the Ontar io Provincial Police Association ( O . P . P . A . ) as the 
bargaining agent for the members of that force. See The Public Service Amendment Act, 1972, 
S.O. 1972, c. 96, s. 6. The amendment makes a number of spécifie matters subject to collective 
bargaining with arbi t rat ion to résolve impasses. Arbi t ra t ion has not , to date , been resorted t o . 
The parties hâve generally agreed that the Metropol i tan To ron to Police Force is a useful com-
parison. 
25 Op. cit., note 21. 
26 See H . W . A R T H U R S , op. cit., note 15 at p . 90. 
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tion board, the Association^ request was granted in 197427. The issue and 
subséquent arbitral responses reflect the dramatic impact that compulsory 
arbitration can hâve upon public policy and the allocation of public funds. 
The issue also reveals how collective bargaining, in the context of com-
pulsory arbitration, can become insulated from other policy considérations 
making claims on scarce public monies. Where employées make claims by 
way of free collective bargaining, other interest groups in need of public 
funds can at least indirectly participate through the gênerai budgetary pro-
cess and lobbying. The employer has to balance thèse conflicting claims in 
cushioning his position both at the bargaining table and in the political 
arena. Employées, therefore, hâve no absolute right to hâve their claims 
met and are confronted with the employées dilemma of a limited pool of 
money on which many demands are being made in addition to those of col-
lective bargaining. On the other hand, none of thèse other interest groups 
hâve standing before an interest arbitrator and arbitration awards are usual-
ly made, as we will see, without regard for the public employer's ability to 
pay. The Metropolitan Toronto two-man patrol car case also brings into 
serious question the appropriateness of policy-making in a relative vacuum 
of factual information. Adjudication is not a decision-making process best 
suited to solving highly complex polycentric problems28. Indeed, the full 
complexity of the issue and its suitability to interest arbitration is best seen 
from the next arbitration award to deal with it29. 
The second arbitrator was advised by the parties that the Commission's 
case against the two officer car System was the most thorough analysis of 
the issue ever presented to an arbitrator. A large part of the Commission^ 
évidence comprised of reports of various bodies and persons who had 
studied the issue in the past culminating in a 1976 study prepared by Robin 
D. Haie for the Board of Police Commissioners for the Régional Munici-
pality of Waterloo entitled "Two Man Police Cars: Logic or Emotion." 
The Commission also produced extensive évidence on the exceptionally 
sophisticated radio communications network which it had commissioned 
and installed, at least in part to ensure that police officers answering a call 
where the possibility of danger was great would receive rapid support from 
other units. Radio calls for police services were analyzed for each patrol 
district. Current statistics were also reviewed. The Commission also adduc-
27 See Metropolitan Toronto Police Association, unreported, George S. P. 
FERGUSON, April 19, 1974. This award was upheld as a proper élaboration of the term 
"working condition" found in section 29(2) of The Police Act. See Re Metropolitan Toronto 
Board of Commissioners of Police and Metropolitan Toronto Police Association, 1974, 5 0.R. 
(2d) 285; affirmed by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Re Metropolitan Toronto Board of 
Police and Metropolitan Toronto Police Association, 1976, 8 O.R. (2d) 65. On March 11, 1975 
the Suprême Court of Canada refused leave to appeal. 
28 See D.J .M. BROWN, op. cit., note 9 and F U L L E R , The Forms and Limits of Ad-
judication, 1958. See also B E R N S T E I N , The Arbitration of Wages, 1954, p . 114. 
29 See Metropolitan Toronto Police Association, unrepor ted , Kenneth P . S W A N , 
September 29, 1976. For an equally vivid il lustration of this problem; the response of arbi t ra-
tors to the demand by Onta r io nurses for a contract clause dealing with professional responsi-
bility should also be examined. See Mount Sinai Hospital (Toronto) and the Ontario Nurses 
Association, 1977, decided by Arbi t ra tor Burket t . 
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ed évidence of the considérable dislocation of forces caused by the change-
over. Such important services as the York Bureau, the Crime Prévention 
Bureau, the Community Relations Branch and several others were deci-
mated in the massive reassignment of personnel necessary to meet the re-
quirements of the earlier Ferguson award. A drastic réduction of officers 
assigned to downtown foot patrol duty was necessary as well. There was 
also some évidence that a gênerai shortage of personnel had resulted in a 
significant number of delays in responding to some calls for police service 
by patrol units. On the other hand, the Association's case was based on the 
primary issue of safety. It pointed in particular to the murder of a number 
of police officers in Metropolitan Toronto and indicated that the availa-
bility of a backup officer, armed and fully trained, might hâve saved the life 
of the victim of some attacks. In attempting to balance ail of thèse consid-
érations the arbitrator wrote (at pages 23 to 27): 
In the event, the task of balancing those two legitimate interests falls, in the absence of a 
negotiated settlement, to me in nearly the same form as it fell to Judge Ferguson in 1974. The 
method he used to résolve the problem was and I say with no disrespect a blunt instrument. Un-
fortunately, the armory of an arbitrator as I hâve indicated above, contains little else to deal 
with complex and many faceted problems. The expérience of implementation in the 1974 
award and the very full évidence available to me makes it possible for me to do some fine tun-
ing, but I am painfully aware that any award I make will be inadéquate to meet ail of the valid 
considérations involved. My jurisdiction requires me to détermine the présent issue, however, 
and there is no other method of resolution available. 
I hâve therefore determined to confirm the principle of the 1974 award, but to adjust its opéra-
tion to respond more closely to the period when the combination of heightened criminal activi-
ty, movement about the area by citizens and the complicating factor of darkness combined to 
place the greatest demand on police services and to increase the chances of a police officer be-
ing involved in a dangerous situation with no assistance readily available. In addition, I hâve 
determined that it would be proper to restrict somewhat the meaning of "patrol cars" in the 
1974 award. The évidence is that, although there was originally some doubt, the parties treated 
that phrase (at the insistence of the Association) as including cars assigned to traffic patrol du-
ty as well. In the view I hâve taken of the évidence of the safety factor, inclusion of thèse cars in 
my award would not be appropriate. There hâve been no homicidal attacks on traffic officers, 
and it would seem unlikely that the sort of unpredictable attacks which might occur would be 
prevented by having two officers in a car. It is true that traffic officers do some patrol duties 
and that they will be called upon to backup patrol officers, but in thèse cases the police pro-
cédures described above should provide protection as sure as two officer cars would. As their 
patrol activities would be only supplemental to the duties of the patrol area units, the spécifie 
problem of the increased risk during the peak period ought not to affect thèse officers. There 
was évidence of the accidentai death of a traffic officer left alone at an accident scène. While I 
agrée that there ought to hâve been another officer présent, I cannot see that it would make any 
différence whether that officer arrived in the same or another car. 
I therefore award that: 
"Ail uniform patrol cars, except those assigned to traffic duties, shall be manned by two fully 
trained and armed police officers while on patrol between the hours of 4:00 p.m. one day and 
4:00 a.m. the following day, or during such other continuous period of twelve houirs per day as 
shall be designated by the Commission to coincide with the period of peak patrol activity. This 
change shall be fully implemented within a period of ninety days from the date of this award." 
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Most arbitral reasoning is based on comparable standards — what is 
happening elsewhere. In this sensé it is an inherently conservative process. 
By définition, problems of first considération often lack any comparable 
standard. In such situations, therefore, is an arbitrator justified and suited 
to engage in a form of social engineering? Ought he or she to be innovative? 
What is innovative for one party can be absolutely disastrous for another. 
Moreover, innovation is often in the eye of the beholder. An innovative 
solution by a very conservative adjudicator may not be what employée 
représentatives hâve in mind when they demand greater arbitral courage in 
this respect. On the other hand, in a "closed" System like police bargaining 
an adjudicator has no real choice unless prepared to simply say "No". 
The first pièce of législation pertaining to firefighters was The Fire 
Department Hours ofLabour Act30 which was passed on June 4th, 1920 and 
took effect on January lst, 1921. It was also in 1920 that the Provincial 
Fédération of Ontario Professional Fire Fighters was established. By 1927 
there were 27 branches of the Fédération representing 90% of the paid fire 
departments in Ontario. Also in 1927 the first no-strike no-lockout article 
was inserted in its constitution. The Fire Department's Act, as we know it 
today, was passed in 1947 with the repeal of the earlier législation31. 
The adjudication of salaries for fire fighters is a classic example of 
parasitic wage comparisons. Useful private sector comparisons cannot be 
made because of the unique nature of the work. Over time, however, wage 
relationships between local police and fire fighting salaries hâve developed 
with fire fighters' salaries following police salaries by a relatively constant 
differential. Thèse types of comparisons, when measurable and constant, 
do afford workable criteria as their popularity in practice suggests but 
several factors impede their automatic utilization. Comparisons to others 
imply that the affected group will never be a wage leader. Further, if the 
whole industry or area of relevant comparison is subjected to arbitration on 
that basis, in time the entire adjudicative enterprise may "freeze" unless 
tied to a workable and external comparison. This is because comparisons 
dépend on a régime of exchange for their vitality and in time such can be 
displaced by adjudication32. The importance of finding a "link" to the 
private sector for police bargaining is, therefore, crucial to the fire fighter. 
Unfortunately, the search for a stable and acceptable private sector com-
parison has not been very successful. While smaller police forces rely upon 
fair comparisons with the larger police forces of Ontario and larger forces 
rely upon salary relationships with other police officers across Ontario and 
across Canada, the circle of internai comparisons simply gets larger till it 
reaches the last internai comparison. From this point on attempts to "link" 
police salaries with other identifiable employée groups in the private sector 
hâve been fraught with problems. An example of the difficulty is revealed in 
the 1976 Metropolitan Toronto award of Professor Swan, already quoted 
above, where at page 60 he wrote: 
30 S.O. 1920, c. 88. 
31 S.O. 1947, c. 37. 
32 See D . J . M . B R O W N , op. cit., note 9 at p . 25 . 
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Finally, I turned to the question of relativities with other groups of employées in other 
types of employment. This comparison may be the most dif ficult of ail to make, and the parties 
set out a number of alternative approaches. The Association suggested, through Mr. Brown, a 
"link" whereby police salaries would be fixed to a set proportion of some other identifiable 
employée group and would follow the progress of that group in lock step; the basis of the pro-
posai is the British Royal Commission on the Police, 1960 (Cmnd 1222) which proposed a 
direct link to the skilled trades. "Links" hâve been popular in Great Britain, where pay 
research methods hâve been carefully developed in the context of national bargaining patterns, 
but they hâve been very short-lived in Canada, even when successful. The long-standing, but 
now apparently defunct link between teachers in British Columbia and workers in the forest in-
dustry is a good example. Another approach, advanced by Professor Lightman, was a form of 
qualitative job évaluation where the éléments of that technique were used to describe the dif-
férences in the work of various comparable occupations without the quantitative data which 
the technique is normally used to collect. Although I accept the bases of comparison he ad-
vances as relevant, I am of the view, as he himself observed, that the analysis is somewhat sub-
jective. 
"Reasonable people can reasonably disagree on the criteria selected on the particular com-
parisons to be made and on the détails of thèse comparisons." 
There are any number of policing jobs, and a composite picture of the police off icer for the 
purposes of salary détermination ought to be quantitatively based, so that appropriate weight 
is given to the factors which count highest in a job évaluation program, if a reliable resuit is to 
be produced. 
Parasitic wage criteria are criteria that dérive their sustenance from 
another bargaining process33. In relying on such criteria, care must always 
be taken not to use parasitic criteria that will in time undermine the very 
foundations of the adjudicative process. The real problem in police and fire 
wage déterminations generally is their potential for devouring the very basis 
of adjudication. In Ontario police and fire arbitrations there is increasing 
évidence that the System is doing just this. Ail of the critical comparisons 
are centered on the expérience of a few key bargaining situations and they 
lack stable outside comparisons. The entire System, therefore, rests on a 
foundation of shifting sand. 
AD HOC INTERVENTION 
Canadian constitutional law views municipal corporations as the cré-
atures of statute; they possess neither inhérent powers nor sovereign status. 
Accordingly, in the absence of a spécifie exclusionary provision, munici-
palities fall within the ambit of a gênerai labour relations statute. By the 
mid i960's municipal labour relations had been brought under private sec-
tor législation in almost every Canadian province, including Ontario. There 
are no prohibitions on the right of Ontario municipal employées to strike, 
other than the gênerai requirement that the conciliation procédure provided 
by The Labour Relations Act be exhausted. And on several occasions in ré-
cent years this right has been exercised, as for example in 1966, 1968 and 
1972 when City of Toronto outside workers struck. Although thèse strikes 
potentially pose a serious threat to the community, since the employées in-
33 Ibid., at p. 15. 
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volved include garbage men and operators of the sewage and water supply 
Systems, in fact no danger has ensued. On only one occasion has the 
Ontario Government actually intervened, by ad hoc législation, to require 
compulsory arbitration of a threatened strike of municipal hydro-electric 
employées34. 
The gênerai model followed by the Ontario Législature in ordering em-
ployées back to work on an ad hoc basis is to dictate some minimum per-
centage increase in wages effective immediately on the employées return to 
work, a technique apparently intended to insure co-operation and instill 
some confidence in the arbitration process. The arbitrator is then given 
jurisdiction to award any further or additional increase in compensation he 
thinks justified in the circumstances. 
Despite the wide publicity that was given to strikes by municipal em-
ployées in Toronto in 1972 and in Hamilton in 1973 and by municipal tran-
sit employées in 1974, work stoppages in Ontario municipal governments 
hâve not been that numerous35. Of 5,033 strikes that occurred in Ontario 
between 1958 and 1979, municipal employées were involved in 112 or about 
2% accounting for about 2% of the total employées involved and caused 
0.8% of the man days lost. In only two cases has arbitration been used to 
settle the dispute — a Toronto municipal strike in 1972 and the Toronto 
Transit strike in 1974. 
The ad hoc approach to compulsory arbitration can gain the con-
fidence of labour and management where permanent machinery may not. 
The chairman of the arbitration board can be selected on the basis of his 
particular expérience in the area of the dispute — and certain variations in 
the form of arbitration can be introduced as the situations require. The ad 
hoc choice of key chairman also means that the risk of stultifying précé-
dents is minimized. The aura of uncertainty may also provide its own incen-
tive for settlement36. On the other hand, Prof essor Arthurs has pointed out 
certain difficulties connected with reliance on spécial législation. He writes: 
Ad hoc législation is a dangerous business: It invites politicization of disputes; it changes 
the rules in the middle of the game — and is thus liable to be challenged on grounds of basic 
fairness; and does not afford the parties or the government any long term basis for resolution 
of difficult, structural problems. Moreover, for a government which generally looks to labour 
for support , reliance upon ad hoc législation may simply not be a realistic possibility37 . 
It might also be added that the risk of ad hoc législation can cast a long 
shadow over public interest bargaining which more scapel-like permanent 
législation avoids. 
34 See The Toronto Hydro-Employees' Union Dispute Act, S.O. 1965, c. 131. 
35 Data compiled by the Research Branch, Ontar io Ministry of Labour . 
36 See MATKIN, Government Intervention in Labour Disputes in British Columbia, in 
Gunderson éd. , op. cit., note 18 at p . 98. 
37 A R T H U R S , H . W . , " T h e Dullest Bill: Réfac t ions on the Labour Code of British 
C o l u m b i a " , 1974, 9 UBCL Rev. 280-340 at p . 294. 
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THE HOSPITAL LABOUR DISPUTES ARBITRATION ACT 
The principle underlying collective bargaining in the public hospital 
sector is that each hospital is an autonomous unit responsible for signing 
and complying with the terms of a collective agreement. Bargaining entered 
into by a hospital on a group or province-wide basis is entirely voluntary; 
but, nevertheless, the historical development of bargaining in the hospital 
industry in Ontario reflects an appetite for wider area and, in some cases, 
province-wide bargaining. A number of factors hâve caused this resuit. 
Originally labour-management relations in this sector were covered by 
The Labour Relations Act with the right to strike. And at that time, nurses 
and paramédical staff were virtually non-union. The only hospital em-
ployées organized into unions in any significant degree were service groups 
comprised of dietary, housekeeping, laundry, maintenance and stationary 
engineering employées. Indeed, many hospitals had no unions whatsoever. 
But in 1965 The Hospital Labour Disputes Arbitration Actn was enacted to 
protect the community from disruptions in the delivery of health care fol-
lowing the first strike in hospital bargaining at Trenton Mémorial Hospital. 
The législation applies to both public hospitals and nursing homes and 
homes for the aged. 
While many might view this législation as very restrictive, it is interest-
ing to note that is also changed the climate for union organization of hos-
pital workers and the financial ability of unions to launch organizing cam-
paigns for new members. Statistics suggest that the newly found funds 
unions received from compulsory dues conditions awarded by arbitrators 
(that the hospitals had previously refused to concède), coupled with the 
élimination of any risk to employées of being called out on strike, led to 
considérable union success in organizing hospital units. As well, the Regis-
tered Nurses Association of Ontario support of nursing groups interested in 
collective bargaining rapidly led to the certification of many nursing bar-
gaining units across the province39. Many technician and technologist 
groups also organized for collective bargaining and greatly increased the 
number of separate bargaining groups in the hospital field. The rapid esca-
lation in the number of employées organized and the prolifération of 
separate bargaining units created, at least from the employers' viewpoint, 
whipsawing and leapfrogging pressures both within the hospitals and be-
tween hospitals. As each agreement was settled, either directly or by arbitra-
tion, it created a new plateau or floor for other negotiations related either 
geographically or by job similarity. In addition to thèse direct monetary 
costs, the numerous negotiations caused the collective bargaining expenses 
of both parties to rise sharply over this period. 
This was the state of hospital bargaining in 1974 which led the 
Johnston Commission40 to make recommendations for improvement in 
38 S.O. 1965, c. 48 . 
39 See generally, The Report of the Hospital Inquiry Commission, ("The Johnston 
Commission") 1974, p. 36 et seq.; GLASBECK, "Compulsory Arbitration in Canada", in 
Lowenberg éd., op. cit., note 10 at pp. 56-63; The Impact of the Ontario Hospital Labour 
Disputes Arbitration Act 1965: A Statistical Anatysis 1970. 
40 Ibid. 
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negotiation procédures by reducing the bargaining groups to three; service, 
nursing and paramédical. The Commission also supported province-wide 
negotiations on central matters with local issues being left for settlement 
within each hospital. The Commission's view was that the parties should 
work towards a System of province-wide bargaining on a voluntary basis 
rather than having the System imposed through législation and it recom-
mended that the bargaining agents work toward the goal of bargaining by 
way of a council of trade unions. However, the Commission stated that if 
the unions could not reach this goal voluntarily then it should be legislated. 
Since the publication of the Johnston Report the parties hâve engaged 
in wider area bargaining and when impasses hâve necessitated compulsory 
arbitration, one or two arbitration awards hâve set the pattern for the entire 
industry whether by agreement of the parties at the outset of the arbitration 
or as a resuit of de facto collective bargaining pressures subséquent to the 
handing down of the award. Thus, while in 1976 it was reported that only 
3% of ail the agreements arrived at in hospital bargaining were the product 
of compulsory arbitration, it must be noted that the other 97% of thèse set-
tlements designated as non-arbitrated were based almost completely on the 
few arbitrated agreements during that period. Thus, incidence of arbitra-
tion statistics provide a deceptive picture of the real impact of compulsory 
arbitration in hospital collective bargaining in Ontario41. Nevertheless, even 
when only arbitration incidence statistics are examined one does observe a 
discernable trend to greater reliance upon direct third party intervention. In 
1976 we noted that only 3% of employées were directly subject to a com-
pulsory arbitration award. In 1977 the number of employées increased to 
16%. In 1978 Ontario experienced a dramatic increase in compulsory arbi-
tration affecting 69% of ail employées subject to collective bargaining that 
year and in 1979 48% of ail hospital employées engaging in collective bar-
gaining were subject to a compulsory arbitration award42. Thèse statistics 
tend to bear out the corrosive and narcotic effect of compulsory arbitration. 
It is also undisputable that the incidence of compulsory interest arbitration 
is much greater than the incidence of agreements arising out of work stop-
pages or strike activity. (See page 16 herein.) 
From the very inception of the législation the extent to which bargain-
ing parties in hospitals reached voluntary agreements has tended to décline. 
A study published in 1970, looking at the first five years of opération of the 
législation, reported that in the two years prior to the législation, approxi-
mately one-half of ail settlements were made at the pre-conciliation bar-
gaining stage and one quarter at the conciliation officers stage. Of the re-
maining 25%, half were settled by conciliation boards and half in post-
conciliation bargaining. Only two strikes occurred43. When the Act came in-
to effect, the proportion of non-voluntary agreements increased resulting in 
a greater incidence of arbitration awards than the previous incidence of 
strikes. Between August lst, 1965 and July 31st, 1970 the number of ar-
4i For example, I think the DOWNIE study, supra, note 10 at page 59 overlooks this 
reality. 
42 Data compiled by the Research Branch, Ontar io Ministry of Labour . 
43 The Impact of the Ontario Hospital Labour Disputes Arbitration Act 1965: A Statis-
tical Analysis, at p. 3. 
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bitration awards per year grew from 13 to 39. In relative terms the growth in 
awards was less pronounced going from 15% of ail settlements to 25%. 
However, since arbitration was introduced there appears to hâve been a 
gênerai décline in the willingness of the parties to reach voluntary agree-
ment, especially since mid-1969. Indeed, many of the issues presented to 
hospital arbitrators would never be strike issues in private sector collective 
bargaining, suggesting an unwillingness to make tough bargaining décisions 
or a ploy of leaving something for the arbitrator to "split the différence" 
with. 
Compulsory arbitration under the Hospital Disputes Arbitration Act44 
has provided the greatest expérience with interest arbitration criteria in 
Ontario. No criteria for the decision-making function of compulsory arbi-
tration boards is outlined in the statute. In the first arbitration in 1965, the 
arbitrator, Prof essor H.W. Arthurs, adopted the approach that the arbitra-
tion process should try to corne as close to producing what free collective 
bargaining would hâve produced as possible. Accordingly, he provided the 
following list of items which he felt might provide adéquate guidelines to 
the adjudicative rôle he had accorded to hospital arbitrations awards45. 
1) Wages paid in "comparable hospitals", i.e. those of similar type in 
communities enjoying a similar cost of living and average wage level. 
2) Trends in cost of living and average wages in the locality where the hos-
pital is located. 
3) Trends in comparable hospitals. 
Of lesser weight, but also of importance were: 
1) Difficulties encoutered by the hospital in recruiting and holding staff 
(some évidence of the hospital's failure to pay a level of wages high 
enough to attract workers on a local labour market). 
2) Trends in non-comparable hospitals and in non-hospital occupations. 
3) Trends in hospital wages generally. 
Professor Arthurs then went on to say that little weight should be given 
to wage levels in non-comparable hospitals, wages in non-hospital occupa-
tions, and abstract appeals to justice. Unfortunately, as compulsory arbi-
tration began to rely on voluntary made bargains that were comparable 
within the parameters of thèse criteria and such bargains were in turn based 
on the results of compulsory arbitration, a circular kind of reasoning began 
to undermine the integrity of the process. This reality caused boards of arbi-
tration to begin to hâve regard to negotiations outside hospitals which were 
truly free of the distorting effects of compulsory arbitration. In the Peel 
Mémorial Hospital case46 Professor Weiler made this point in writing: 
After a time the arbitration décisions themselves become a major factor in determining the 
kinds of settlements which will be agreed to. With the relative uncertainty of a strike replaced 
44 R.S.O. 1970, c. 208, s. 4. 
45 Welland County Hospital, 1965, 16 L.A.C. 1. 
46 1969, 20 L . A . C . 31 . 
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by more predictable patterns in arbitration awards, the level of private agreement will tend to 
reflect the trends in the awards. If this is the case, one complètes the vicious circle if the awards 
are themselves justified by patterns of wages arrived at by settlement. It is no longer possible as 
it was in the earlier décisions, to extrapolate from the status quo before the Act. Arbitrators 
must begin to hâve référence to negotiations outside hospitals which are truly free of the distor-
ting effects of compulsory arbitration. 
In an award involving the Toronto Wellesley Hospital in 1976, the ar-
bitrator, Kevin M. Burkett, generalized this approach as it had developed in 
writing that equity in compulsory arbitration must flow from "community 
compensation standards*'47. It was stated that if the tax paying public déter-
mines that it requires an uninterrupted service then it must be prepared to 
pay those who provide the service compensation commensurate with com-
munity standards48. Such standards were to be determined on the évidence 
by establishing a relationship between those affected by the adjudication 
and other jobs which reflected community compensation standards. How-
ever, the approach assumes the existence of constant and rational links be-
tween the private and public sectors and in many situations this assumption 
is highly debatable. Community compensation standards or parasitic cri-
teria may be acceptable on one occasion because the resuit is acceptable. 
But when conditions change, their acceptability can be put into question. A 
good example of this lack of stability can be seen on the very next attempt to 
apply the Wellesley Hospital rationale. 
The Wellesley Hospital board of arbitration was dealing with the com-
pensation of registered nurses and in choosing a community standard the 
board chose the surrogate relationship between registered nursing assistants 
and registered nurses. This internai relationship was chosen because the 
registered nursing assistants had already settled with the hospitals and there 
appeared to be a historical relationship between the compensation of 
R.N.A.'s and R.N.'s during the previous two years of province-wide bar-
gaining. The board reasoned that, first, a registered nursing assistant 
belonged to the same work group as a registered nurse; second, registered 
nursing assistants were members of a service unit which included classifica-
tions found in the private sector and hence the assumption of an indirect or 
parasitic relationship for R.N.'s with the private sector; third, registered 
nursing assistants were covered by a collective agreement extending to 
March 31st, 1978; and fourth, there was évidence before the board which 
established the existence of a historical differential of 74% to 75% between 
the start rates for the registered nursing assistant and registered nurse. In 
fact, on the basis of weighted average monthly rates, the parties themselves 
negotiated a differential of just under 75% for the 1975 calendar years. 
Unfortunately, however, this approach had the effect of determining 
the compensation of more highly paid nurses by the compensation paid to 
lesser qualified and lesser paid registered nursing assistants where the wages 
of the registered nursing assistants were settled or determined first. In the 
47 The Wellesley Hospital, unreported, Kevin M. BURKETT, April 12, 1977, at p . 7. 
48 For a more récent example of the same approach taken in the context of a police 
award see The Metropolitan Toronto Police Association, as yet unreported, Kevin M. 
BURKETT, June 4 , 1980. 
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next round of bargaining for nurses this is exactly what happened and the 
nurses found the ONA settlement to be totally unacceptable in terms of the 
resuit that would be generated for them. With a key interest arbitration for 
nurses scheduled in June of 1979, the hospitals settled in March with the 
S.E.I.U. for 43 hospitals — a negotiated settlement affecting 8,100 service 
workers including the registered nursing assistants. This settlement was 
somewhere in the order of 5.6% annually and it was the first major settle-
ment of the year in the hospital sector. It was also somewhat out of tune 
with annual base wage rate increases in Ontario manufacturing which were 
at about 7.6% and with the rate of inflation. Thus, in the June arbitration 
dealing with the nurses the employers requested Professor Swan, the arbi-
trator, to rely exclusively upon the settlement between 8,100 service workers 
in determining the gênerai wage increase for over 18,000 nurses and relied 
heavily on the Wellesley Hospital award rationale of Arbitrator Burkett. In 
refusing to do so and thereby rejecting the "historical" 75% relationship 
between R.N.A.'s and R.N.'s, Professor Swan wrote: 
There are, however, other factors which ought to be taken into considération in deciding 
whether this board can accept the S.E.I.U. settlement as an ironclad indicator of the appro-
priate salary range for registered nurses. First, and most important , the S.E.I.U. agreement 
covers only the 43 hospitals, whereas our award will, by virtue of the application of the 
"province-wide reali ty" to which we hâve referred above, cover some 133 hospitals. Another 
S.E.I .U. local in now at arbitration, and another major bargaining agent, the Canadian Union 
of Public Employées, is still negotiating for the registered nursing assistants which it represents 
and the rest of the hospitals to which we must hâve référence. There is no sign that the S.E.I .U. 
settlement will lead to an immédiate replication of the terms of that settlement for R .N.A. ' s 
elsewhere. It seems, therefore, that the circumstances which face the Wellesley Hospital ar-
bitrators, in which most of the bargaining which would provide data for an internai com-
parisons study was completed are not those which face us at the présent time4 9 . 
The rest of the award, however, serves to demonstrate how imprécise 
criteria can be when arbitrating without the benefit of a key determining set-
tlement and few arbitration awards which hâve attempted to reach beyond 
the isolated search for a comparable community standard hâve fared bet-
ter50. One récent and important attempt to give some order to interest ar-
bitration decision-making was undertaken by arbitrator Shime in British 
Columbia Railway Company and Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way 
Employées, Caribou Lodge, 221 et al. (1977)51. In that case he outlined a 
complex of additional considérations that any interest dispute adjudicator 
should take into account. They included: 
49 Kingston General Hospital, unreported, Kenneth P . SWAN, June 12, 1979, at pp . 
22-23. 
50 Also see K .P . SWAN, Criteria In Interest Arbitration, 1978. 
51 Cited and reviewed in York Régional Board of Health, 1978, 18 L. A .C . (2d) 255, at p . 
267. 
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1. Public sector employées should not be required to subsidize the com-
munity by accepting sub-standard wages and working conditions. 
2. Cost of living. 
3. Productivity. 
4. Comparisons (a) internai, 
(b) (i) external — in the same industry, 
(ii) external — not in the same industry but similar 
work. 
The most comprehensive attempt to develop a meaningful set of cri-
teria and procédures for compulsory arbitration in Ontario is found in the 
Johnston Commission Report referred to above. The Commission recom-
mended that the following criteria should be used in the seulement of terms 
and conditions of employment in collective agreements in public hospitals 
in Ontario: 
The need to ascertain and préserve appropriate relationships in the conditions of employ-
ment (a) as between occupations in public hospitals and (b) as compared to similar occupations 
outside the public hospitals with due regard for the labour market areas specified in appro-
priate législation52. 
Thèse criteria were to be embodied in The Hospital Labour Disputes Act 
and accorded equal weight by arbitrators. For the successful application of 
the first recommended criterion, the Commission recommended that a com-
prehensive and dependable job évaluation System be established. To achieve 
external comparability and to link hospitals with the private sector, the 
Commission recommended agreement between the parties on a set of 
benchmark occupations which were easily compared from establishment to 
establishment, i.e. cleaner, switchboard operator, stationary engineer and 
electrician. By negotiating compensation for such benchmarks, the parties 
to hospital bargaining were to be able to obtain settlements which reflected 
those in the private sector. Having negotiated the changes in benefits for the 
benchmark occupations, it was then thought to be a simple task to apply 
thèse increases to ail other occupations in public hospitals in accordance 
with the relationships established by the proposed job évaluation system. 
However, the Commission went on to note that if external comparisons 
were to be meaningfully applied as criteria for setting hospital compensa-
tion, it was important to establish explicit labour market boundaries that 
were broad enough to afford a sufficient number of external comparisons. 
After examining statistical data by way of a job matching survey, the Com-
mission was satisfied that in any area the size of one of the ten économie 
régions of Ontario or one of the 14 Ontario Hospital Association districts, 
an abundance of good external job matches could be found across a broad 
cross section of industries. In other words, the Commission did not see 
compulsory arbitration as leading to uniform wage rates across the Pro-
vince. Finally, the Johnston Commission took the position that a resource 
centre to provide proper statistical information was necessary for the suc-
cessful réhabilitation of compulsory arbitration in public hospitals. In the 
52 Op. cit., note 39 at p. 28. 
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Commission^ view, if arbitrators were to base awards on the criterion of 
extemal comparability they must hâve access to reliable, independent and 
up-to-date comparative data on wages and benefits. In the absence of a pay 
research agency, the Commission was highly skeptical that the proposée! 
législative criteria would improve the performance of compulsory arbitra-
tion. It thought the absence of reliable outside comparisons would simply 
increase the risk of highly controversial décisions based on inadéquate in-
formation. However, to date, thèse recommendations hâve not been acted 
upon. 
THE PUBLIC SERVICE OF ONTARIO 
The Crown Employées Collective Bargaining Act53, provides for the 
compulsory arbitration of interest disputes involving civil servants. Section 
3(2) of that Act provides that certain "bargaining units designated in the 
régulations are appropriate units for collective bargaining". Ontario Reg. 
577/72, section 11, in effect establishes one large residual bargaining unit 
which embraces most provincial government employées who are entitled to 
collective bargaining. The Ontario Public Service Employées Union 
(O.P.S.E.U.) holds the bargaining rights for approximately 52,000 em-
ployées who fall within this massive bargaining unit — a unit which bears 
no resemblance to any other unit ail of which are much smaller and more 
homogenous54. In order to couteract the adverse effects of bargaining size 
the parties, early on and by agreement, began to bargain separately for each 
of five broad occupational catégories. They also made a distinction between 
benefits and working conditions and hâve negotiated each separately. In ef-
fect, the parties hâve thereby maintained uniformity in respect of benefits 
and other conditions of employment while establishing eight catégories or 
bargaining groups, each of which negotiates separately in respect of salary 
scales. 
Section 6 and 17(1) of the statute authorizes an employée bargaining 
organization to represent employées on spécifie terms and conditions of 
employment while excluding many others. Section 17(1) provides that every 
collective agreement shall be deemed to pro vide that it is the exclusive... 
function of the employer to manage and manage is defined to include: 
(a) employment, appointment, complément, organization, assignment, 
discipline, dismissal, suspension, work methods and procédures, kinds 
and locations of equipment and classification of positions; and 
(b) a merit System, training and development, appraisal and super annua-
tion, the governing principles of which are subject to review by the em-
ployer with the bargaining agent. 
The provision goes on to specifically provide that such matters will not 
be the subject of collective bargaining nor will they corne within the juris-
diction of a board of arbitration. 
53 S.O. 1972, c. 135, s. 9, as amended by S.O. 1974, c. 135, s. 4. 
54 See A R T H U R S , op. cit., note 15 at p . 111. 
55 S.O. 1972, c. 67. 
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The Crown Employées Collective Bargaining Act55, in contrast to the 
Hospital Labour Disputes Arbitration Act, sets out guidelines or criteria 
that a board of arbitration shall consider relevant in resolving matters in 
dispute. However, the criteria are extremely gênerai and hâve provided no 
greater measure of predictability to the process. Thèse criteria take the fol-
lowing form56: 
(a) the needs of the crown and its agencies for qualified employées; 
(b) the conditions of employment in similar occupations outside the public 
service, including such géographie, industrial or other variations as the 
board may consider relevant; 
(c) the desirability to maintain appropriate relationships in the conditions 
of employment as between classifications of employées; and 
(d) the need to establish terms and conditions of employment that are fair 
and reasonable in relation to the qualifications required, the work per-
formed, the responsibility assumed and the nature of the services 
rendered. 
Unfortunately, there is no independent pay research body for Ontario 
public service bargaining to provide detailed and acceptable data. There-
fore, the union and Government each hâve developed différent statistical 
gathering procédures, although when benchmark jobs are negotiated, they 
normally agrée upon a list of spécifie classifications and the number of em-
ployées in those classifications. Prof essor Arthurs has suggested that the 
différences in research material used by the parties may contribute to their 
failure to reach agreements57. Related difficulties hâve arisen from the par-
ties' différent interprétations of the same facts and the différences in value 
placed upon such factors as mobility and security of tenure. Possibly some 
of thèse différences could be resolved by the establishment of an indepen-
dent pay research bureau supported by both parties as exists at the fédéral 
level. However, neither party seems particularly interested in seeking an in-
dependent bureau, both apparently taking the view that data and informa-
tion supplied by a neutral agency would be subject to différent interpréta-
tions in any event. 
Statistics on the incidence of interest arbitration indicate a substantial 
dependence on the process. For example, in 1977 approximately 48% of ail 
employées were subject to an arbitrated seulement and in 1978 some 25% of 
provincial employées were subject to arbitration. But in 1979 negotiations 
were very successful and 97% of ail employées negotiating during that year 
were covered by non-arbitrated settlements. Overall, since 1963 when bar-
gaining began, there hâve been 64 sets of negotiations; 29 hâve resulted in 
agreements achieved in direct negotiations; 15 hâve involved seulement at 
the médiation stage; and 20 or approximately 30% hâve gone to compulsory 
arbitration58. There is therefore a substantial reliance upon the interest ar-
bitration process and an examination of some of thèse awards reveals that 
by the time the parties get to the arbitrator they are often very far apart. 
56 S.O. 1972, c. 67, c. 11(2), as amended by S.O. 1974, c. 135, s. 7. 
57 See ARTHURS, op. cit., note 15 at p. 117. 
58 Date compilée! by the Research Branch, Ontario Ministry of Labour. 
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On the other hand, there does not appear to be any overall discontent 
with the System. Although the O.P.S.E.U. has recently affiliated with the 
Ontario Fédération of Labour and the most récent brief of the Ontario 
Fédération of Labour to Government recommends that the right to strike be 
extended to Ontario's public servants, real employée interest in such a right 
is very debatable. But this is not to say that labour relations in Ontario's 
public service has always been tranquil. In 1974 an unlawful strike was 
threatened by the operating catégories of civil servants in respect to which 
the Government responded with an offer of over 21% for one year. This 
situation and a similar incident involving hospital nurses suggest that in a 
highly bureaucratized collective bargaining structure real change seems to 
march hand in hand with crisis and confrontation. In order to achieve this 
crisis pitch in collective bargaining disputes must be elevated to the level of 
highly-charged and politicized confrontations. By the same token, in order 
to get law-abiding public servants to threaten an unlawful strike collective 
bargaining issues hâve to be converted into moral principles worthy of such 
action, a resuit which is really a négation of the ordinary collective bar-
gaining process. 
Neither under The Hospital Labour Disputes Arbitration Act nor 
under The Crown Employées Collective Bargaining Act is there a perma-
nent and independent administrative tribunal responsible for interest ar-
bitrations. Rather, boards of arbitration are established on an ad hoc basis 
and are manned by private arbitrators selected by the parties or appointed 
by the Government. There are advantages and disadvantages with this ap-
proach. The major disadvantage is a lack of consistency and expertise in the 
application of the relevant principles. Some arbitrators are more experi-
enced in interest arbitration matters than others and not ail arbitrators give 
the same weight to the various criteria that are relevant to any décision. This 
reliance on ad hoc boards of arbitration in Ontario may be symptomatic of 
an overall neglect of the arbitration process as may be the failure to estab-
lish independent pay research boards for the various industries or services 
dépendent on compulsory interest arbitration procédures. On the other 
hand, one of the advantages of ad hoc arbitration boards is that arbitrators 
are not dépendent upon interest arbitration cases for their livelihood. This 
latter feature of Ontario's System may mean then, that those who engage in 
interest arbitration are more independent and capable of making difficult 
décisions that a permanent tribunal would be. Similarly, no one group of 
arbitrators needs absorb the political buffeting and abuse that often cornes 
with making interest arbitration décisions. Fortunately, one of the strengths 
of industrial relations in Ontario is the relative abundance of experienced 
independent arbitrators who are able to function in the arbitration process 
in a fairly sophisticated manner. They may make up for the lack of struc-
tural sophistication in Ontario's interest arbitration Systems. At least one 
hopes this is the case. 
TEACHER SCHOOL BOARD NEGOTIATIONS IN ONTARIO: 
AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH 
Until 1975, Ontario was the only province in Canada that lacked légis-
lation governing negotiations between school boards and teachers. But after 
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more than five years of public discussion and labour relations conflict, Bill 
100 was passed by the législature on July 18th, 1975, and became known as 
The School Boards and Teachers Collective Bargaining Act 197559. On the 
passage of this Act Ontario assumed a leadership rôle in public éducation 
collective bargaining60. 
The statute maintained, to a great degree, the traditional customs and 
practices developed in Ontario over the preceding 50 years in teacher-school 
board bargaining and this is one of the great strengths of the législation. By 
not imposing a totally foreign System on the parties, the Province may hâve 
avoided the kind of adverse reaction that accompanied Great Britain's im-
portation of Taft-Hartley a few years back. Negotiations continue to be car-
ried on at the local level between the school and the members of the branch 
affiliâtes employed by the board. A branch affiliate, the local unit of one of 
the teacher organizations, includes ail the teachers employed by a board 
who are members of the same provincial affiliate. Either local party, how-
ever, may obtain bargaining ad vice or assistance from outside sources, i.e. 
their respective provincial représentatives. Agreements are for a minimum 
of one year and ail become effective on September lst and expire on August 
31 st. The scope of negotiations may cover any term or condition of employ-
ment, but no term of an agreement may conflict with existing législation. 
Every agreement must include a grievance procédure to résolve disputes that 
may arise during the life of the agreement. At any time during negotiations, 
teachers and trustées may ask the Education Relations Commission 
(E.R.C.) for ad vice which usually means médiation assistance. A little more 
will be said about the Commission in a moment. 
From an impasse resolution point of view, the most important feature 
of the Act is the teachers' right to strike. At the request of both teacher and 
trustée organizations, the Government granted the teachers the right to 
strike. A strike is defined to include a work-to-rule, mass résignations, and 
the withdrawal of services. The Act also permits a board to respond to 
strike action by locking out the teachers and closing the schools. However, 
before strike action can be taken, the fact-finding process prescribed by the 
Act must be followed, and the Commission must supervise votes of the 
branch affiliâtes both on the last offer received from the board and on 
whether the members favour strike action. The branch affiliate must also 
give the board at least five days notice prior to strike action. Finally, the Act 
specifically provides for the voluntary adoption by the parties of either con-
ventional interest arbitration or final offer sélection, which means that at 
any time during the negotiating process the parties, on mutual agreement, 
can opt for one of thèse two other ways provided by statute to résolve their 
différences. 
The Education Relations Commission (E.R.C.) is composed of five 
persons appointed by the Lieutenant Governor-in-Council. It was estab-
lished to supervise and co-ordinate the collective bargaining process as well 
as to provide a bu ffer between the political and the collective bargaining 
processes. The E.R.C. functions include: 
59 S.O. 1975, c. 72. 
60 See generally, B. DOWNIE, Collective Bargaining Conflict Resolution in Education, 
1978. 
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(a) to maintain an awareness of negotiations between teachers and boards; 
(b) to compile statistical information on the supply, distribution, profes-
sional activities and salaries of teachers; 
(c) to provide such assistance to the parties as may facilitate the making or 
renewing of agreements; 
(d) to sélect and where necessary to train persons who may act as media-
tors, fact finders, arbitrators or selectors; 
(e) to détermine at the request of every party or in the exercise of its discré-
tion whether or not either of the parties is or was negotiating in good 
faith and making every reasonable effort to make or renew an agree-
ment; 
(0 to détermine the matter of évaluation and to supervise votes by secret 
ballot pur suant to the Act; and 
(g) to advise the Lieutenant Governor in Council when, in the opinion of 
the Commission, the continuance of the strike, lockout or closing of a 
school or schools will place in jeopardy the successful completion of 
courses of study by the students affected by the strike, lockout or clos-
ing of the school or schools. 
Since the inception of the Act there hâve been 997 bargaining situa-
tions. In only 29 cases has a strike occurred and in 47 situations the parties 
hâve opted for interest arbitration. Thus, arbitration has been mutually 
resorted to more often than économie action and the overwhelming majori-
ty of negotiations hâve been settled without the need for either terminal 
event. The results of final offer sélection, where adopted, hâve been closely 
studied on occasion61. The indications are that final offer sélection (F.O.S.) 
works best when it is agreed to as the method of dispute resolution from the 
outset of bargaining, thereby generating the kind of pressures for reasona-
bleness encouraged by potential économie conflict. It has also been pointed 
out that while issue-for-issue final offer sélection avoids the possibility of an 
arbitrator having to choose between two unreasonable contract proposais, 
it does not generate the same kind of pressures that help avoid the need to 
go to arbitration in the first place. The expérience has also been that F.O.S. 
is less expensive and more expeditious than conventional interest arbitra-
tion. I assume this results from the capacity of the parties to télescope their 
présentations in respect of the justification of a single package configura-
tion. F.O.S, also stresses overall reasonableness as the prééminent criterion 
for sélection and thus encourages parties to keep this factor in mind 
throughout their collective bargaining relationship. A final important 
feature of F.O.S. is that it apparently reduces the absolute number of issues 
that need to be arbitrated in any particular situation. 
One of the most significant interest arbitration awards handed down in 
teacher board bargaining, albeit it was legislated on an ad hoc basis, arose 
out of the Métro Toronto school teachers' strike in 1975. This was the first 
major strike testing the législation. After the strike had been in progress for 
some six weeks, the E.R.C. assigned a three-man médiation team to attempt 
a resolution but the team*s efforts failed. Mr. Justice Dubin of the Ontario 
Court of Appeal was then appointed to adjudicate the matters remaining in 
61 See S.A. BELLAN, "Final Offer Sélection: Two Canadian Case Studies and an 
American Digression", 1975, 13 Osgoode Hall L.J. 851-878. 
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dispute. He took the view that it was not his rôle to "split" the différences 
between the parties. He also announced that he would make no effort to 
médiate the outstanding matters because he thought it was inappropriate to 
do so in an arbitration and because every possible médiation device had 
been unsuccessfully inflicted on the parties in any event. Mr. Justice 
Dubin's resulting award is an important décision in interest arbitration 
decision-making but it reveals that even a brilliant jurist is unable to over-
come the imprécision that afflicts decision-making criteria in this area. Bill 
1, the back-to-work législation, did not provide any criteria62 and the learn-
ed Justice noted that there did not appear to be any uniformity over the 
criteria that had been used in past arbitrations dealing with employées in the 
public sector. Accordingly, he constructed his own yardsticks which includ-
ed the foliowing considérations63: 
1. The overall compensation presently received by employées involved in 
the arbitration proceedings including direct wage compensation, vaca-
tions, holidays and other excused time, insurance, pension, médical and 
hospitalization benefits, continuity and stability of employment, and 
ail other benefits received; 
2. A comparison of the wages, hours and conditions of employment of the 
employées involved in the arbitration proceedings with the wages, 
hours and conditions of employment of other employées generally, (1) 
in public employment in the community, and (2) in private employment 
in the community; 
3. A comparison of the wages, hours and conditions of employment for 
the employées involved in the arbitration proceedings with the wages, 
hours and conditions of employment with other employées performing 
similar services within the same municipality and in comparable muni-
cipalities; 
4. The average consumer price for goods and services commonly known 
as the cost of living; 
5. Changes in any of the foregoing factors during the relevant period of 
time; 
6. The économie climate of the day including considération of gross na-
tional product and of the gross provincial product; 
7. The interest and welfare of the public, and the financial ability of those 
who are called upon to pay the cost of the services being rendered. 
62 The Metropolitan Toronto Boards of Education and Disputes Act, 1976, S.O. 1976, 
c. 1. 
For similar législation see also: 
The Kirkland Lake Board of Education and Teachers Dispute Act, 1976, S.O. 1976, c. 3. 
The Central Algoma Board of Education and Teachers Dispute Act, 1976, S.O. 1976, c. 25; 
The Sault Ste. Marie Board of Education and Teachers Dispute Act, 1976, S.O. 1976, c. 26; 
The Windsor Board of Education and Teachers Dispute Act, 1976, S.O. 1976, c. 78. 
63 The Borough of Education for the Borough of East York et al., unreported, Mr. 
Justice DUBIN, March 3, 1976, at pp. 22-23. 
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Teacher-school board collective bargaining is significant in Ontario 
because it demonstrates the capacity of an essential service to function in a 
right-to-strike context. It also demonstrates a pragmatic style of govern-
ment in respect to labour relations, tailoring législative solutions to the 
needs of particular parties. 
CONCLUSION 
Against this background it would be rash to attempt to characterize the 
ethos of compulsory arbitration in Ontario in a word or a phrase. The theo-
retical debate is not dispositive and more philosophical justifications for 
compulsory arbitration hâve had their impact on a "hit-and-miss" basis as 
interest group pressures hâve been brought to bear on the political process. 
Logical explanations are, at times, difficult to corne by. It can be seen that 
weaker groups of employées are becoming increasingly in favour of com-
pulsory arbitration as are various scientific and professional employées. 
This raises the gênerai policy question of whether interest arbitration ought 
to be available to any employer or trade union who so elects to go this route. 
First contract arbitration is an interesting mid-way position. 
There also exists a relatively high degree of satisfaction with com-
pulsory interest arbitration by those employées in Ontario who are subject 
to the process. Indeed, one study examining THe Hospital Labour Disputes 
Act64 found that sixty-six percent of the people that belonged to unions 
seemed satisfied with the disposition made by arbitrators and seventy-five 
percent of their management counterparts indicated satisfaction. In addi-
tion, there can be little doubt that compulsory arbitration has had the 
desired effect of reducing the number of strikes. Against ail of this it can be 
seen that the cases for and against the use of interest arbitration are mixed 
and essentially dépend on timing, context and attitude. 
Interest arbitration is, however, a blunt and conservative instrument. 
Solutions to complex problems are not easily achieved and breakthrough 
bargaining is unsuited to it. Arbitration also tends to be a labour market 
leveler sometimes producing wage compression conflict between various 
groups of employées. The process also insulates collective bargaining in the 
public sector from the legitimate claims of other interest groups who are ex-
cluded from participating in décisions which impact on them. At least in a 
free collective bargaining régime thèse interests can try to influence the em-
ployer (i.e. Government) who is politically accountable for its action. But 
none of this is to deny that there is little évidence interest arbitration has had 
a significant économie impact over and above what free collective bargain-
ing has incurred; that it has reduced the incidence of strike action; and that 
its présence may actually hâve encouraged the spread of collective bargain-
ing throughout the ranks of salaried professional, technical and clérical 
employées. Ail of which leaves us with the problem we set out to address — 
that of "detecting (appropriate) policy'*. 
64 The Impact of the Ontario Labour Disputes Arbitration Act, 1965, supra, footnote 
39. 
